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Abstract. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of firm size on earnings management. The population in this 
study is the Indonesian Stock Exchange listed company in 2010-2014. The final sample was obtained 418 companies or 1.887 
firm-year observation. The sample was selected using purposive sampling technique with some criteria. Research hypotheses 
were tested by multiple linear regression analysis. Based on test results, it was found that the financial leverage variable has a 
significant and positive impact to earnings management. The limitations of this research was only five years the company's 
data, does not include other variables that have a significant effect, as well as research using data of public companies. 
Keywords: discretionary accrual, earnings management, financial leverage 
                                                             
*Corresponding author. E-mail: astrilinasmi@gmail.com 
 
 
62 A. Linasmi | Journal of Applied Accounting and Taxation 2 (1) 61-67 
 
 
Introduction 
Company activity leads to separation of ownership 
and control between owners of companies 
(shareholders) and managers of companies 
(management). In business development, corporate 
management does not always act in the interests of 
the principal. This is then called the agency conflict. 
High subjectivity in company management provides 
an opportunity to manipulate income, thus giving a 
false picture of the content of financial statements. 
The engineering activity of making the financial 
statements is irrelevant to the needs of the company 
owner. 
Over the last two decades many studies have 
focused on accrual-based income and it is known that 
firms have a strong motivation to manage their 
income. The size of the firm affects the company's 
tendency in earnings management and smaller firms 
are better able to keep company confidential 
information than large companies (Lee & Choi, 
2002). Other studies have found evidence that larger 
firms have lesser motivation to level profits than 
small firms (Albrecth & Richardson, 1990). This is 
because investors and governments find it easier to 
research large companies (Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
In contrast, other research results prove that large 
firms have greater motivation in smoothing earnings 
(Moses, 1987). 
In addition to firm size, other factors affecting 
earnings management practices are sales growth. This 
variable is used in research models to detect cases of 
companies with very high sales growth will result in 
information asymmetry. This situation can lead to a 
boost in earnings management. 
In relation to financial leverage, one of the 
alternative sources of corporate funds in addition to 
selling shares in the capital market is through external 
sources of funds in the form of debt. The Company 
will endeavor to fulfill the debt agreement in order to 
obtain good judgment from the creditors. The 
motivation of the company to make earnings 
management is to meet external funding needs and 
fulfill the debt agreement (Dechow et al., 1995). 
The purpose of this research is to know the 
influence of financial leverage to earnings 
management, to know the effect of sales growth on 
earnings management, and to know the effect of firm 
size to earnings management. 
Literature Review 
Agency Theory 
An important issue in a surveillance system is the 
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
existence of a separation of ownership by the 
principal and the management of the firm by an agent 
may lead to agency conflict. The concept of agency 
theory is the relationship or contract between the 
principal and the agent. The principal employs agents 
to perform tasks for the best interests of the principal, 
including delegating decision-making authority from 
principal to agent. In companies whose capital 
consists of shares, shareholders act as principals, and 
CEOs as agents. Agency theory assumes that each 
individual is motivated to fulfill his or her own self-
interest, thus causing conflict between the principal 
and the agent of the company. Principals are 
motivated to prosper themselves with increasing 
profitability. The agent is motivated to maximize the 
fulfillment of economic and psychological needs, 
such as obtaining investment, loans, and contracts 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 2006). 
Principal and agent relationships are often 
determined by accounting numbers. This spurred the 
agent to manage the numbers to fit the principal's 
goals and still gain personal gain for him. One form 
of agency action is earnings management (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). 
Discretionary Profit and Accrual Management 
Profit management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and transaction 
settlement in financial statements that mislead 
shareholders about low economic performance or to 
influence contract yields that depend on accounting 
figures reported. This indicates that managers use 
existing policies to mislead financial statement users 
to achieve the desired results (Helay & Wahlen, 
1999). 
Various profit management patterns are taking a 
bath, income minimization, income maximization, 
and income smoothing. Taking a bath is a form of 
decrease in earnings in the current period in order for 
reported earnings in future periods to increase. 
Income minimization is similar to taking a bath but 
does not expect high returns in the future. In contrast 
to income maximization that reports high net income 
for bonus purposes. Income smoothing is a form of 
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earnings management performed by leveling the 
reported earnings (Scott, 2014). 
Accounting manipulation, in this case earnings 
management, can be seen through discretionary 
accrual. Discretionary accrual is the amount 
considered as a deviation from the amount of accruals 
that should be in normal condition (Baridwan & 
Hariani, 2010). Discretionary accrual (DA) is used as 
an indicator of the practice of earnings management 
because it emphasizes the policy of managers in 
selecting and applying accounting principles to 
achieve the final result (Bernstein & Wild, 1998). 
Measurement of this variable using modified jones 
models. This gauge has been confirmed by many 
researchers as an effective tool for detecting 
abnormal accruals (Llukani, 2013). 
Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage or leverage factor is the ratio of 
book value of all debt to total assets. Financial 
leverage also shows the extent to which the 
company's assets have been financed by the use of 
debt. Financial leverage is proxy with debt to total 
assets acquired through total debt divided by total 
assets. The existence of an indication of the 
company's earnings management to avoid breach of 
debt agreement can be seen through the company's 
ability to pay off its debts by using assets owned. 
Firms that have high leverage rates are allegedly 
doing income smoothing so that management makes 
policies that can increase revenue (Kasmir, 2011). 
Sales Growth 
Growth on sales is an important indicator of 
market acceptance of the company's products and/or 
services. This is because revenue generated from 
sales will be used to measure sales growth rates 
(Swastha & Handoko, 2008). 
Sales growth is used to detect earnings 
management cases because firms with very high 
growth can produce information asymmetry. This 
situation may indicate a practice of earnings 
management. Companies with high sales growth are 
likely to be motivated to practice earnings 
management, when faced with the problem of 
maintaining earnings trends and sales trends. 
Conversely, in companies with low sales growth 
rates, they have a tendency to mislead earnings 
reports or earnings changes through profit-making 
manipulations (Kim et al., 2003). 
Company Size 
The size of a company is a benchmark of the size 
of the company by looking at the value of equity, 
sales value or total value of assets owned by the 
company. The size of a company is a scale that can 
be classified large companies by various means, 
including: total assets, log size, market value (market 
value), and others. Various studies observe in 
different ways, but generally the determination of 
company size based on the total assets of the 
company (Harahap, 2008). Company size is often 
used as an indicator for the possibility of bankruptcy 
for a company. This is because companies with larger 
sizes are considered more able to face the crisis in 
running their business. 
Research Methods 
The study population is all non-financial 
companies of Indonesia Stock Exchange which 
recorded period 2010-2014. Sample selection based 
on purposive sampling method with the following 
criteria, non-financial sector companies and the 
company presents the financial statements for the 
period 2010-2014. 
The final result of the sample is 418 companies or 
1,887 data of the company year. The dependent 
variable used in this study is earnings management, 
while the independent variables are financial 
leverage, sales growth, and total natural asset 
logarithm. 
Results and Discussion 
Discretionary accrual (DA) as a proxy of earnings 
management is measured using modified jones model 
with the following formula. 
 
         TAt                   1           ΔREVt-ΔARt       PPEt  
DAt =      - (β0+β1t        +β2t          +β3t        ) 
  At-1                 At-1                At-1      At-1 
 
 
DAt = Discretionary accrual year t. 
TAt = Total accrual year t. 
At-1 = Total assets year t-1. 
ΔREVt = Difference in total year sales t and total 
year t-1 sales. 
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ΔARt = Difference in total receivables for year t 
and total receivables for year t-1. 
PPEt = Total Property, plant and Equipment year t. 
β1, β2, β3 = coefficients. 
 
High financial leverage (FL) indicates an 
increasingly high company's failure to repay loans 
and obligations. Firms with high debt levels are at 
high risk, resulting in fluctuations in earnings and 
encouraging management to practice earnings 
management. 
 
H1: Financial leverage affects earnings 
management 
 
The ratio of financial leverage shows the 
comparison of borrowed funds from creditors 
compared with the assets of the company. 
Measurement of independent variable financial 
leverage using debt to ratio or debt to asset. 
 
   Total debt 
Debt ratio/debt to asset =  
   Total asset 
 
Companies with high sales growth (SG) are likely 
to be motivated to practice earnings management, 
when faced with the problem of maintaining earnings 
trends and sales trends. Conversely, firms with low 
sales rates have a tendency to mislead earnings or 
earnings changes through earnings manipulation. 
 
H2: Sales growth affects earnings management 
 
Measurement of the independent variable of sales 
growth using the following formula. 
 
             Sales total t - sales total t - 1 
Sales growth =                  x 100% 
        Sales total t - 1 
 
Sales growth = Company's sales growth in 
percentage. 
Total sales t = Total sales year t. 
Total sales t-1 = Total sales year t-1. 
 
The size of the firm plays an important role in 
terms of profit manipulation. Both large companies 
and small firms each tend to manage their earnings. 
 
H3: Company size affects earnings management 
 
The independent variable of logarithm of natural 
asset (LnA) is dummy variable that is 1 if the natural 
log of total asset of a company is bigger than average 
value compared to other company. Grouping these 
large and small companies using Microsoft Excel 
applications. 
Initial test before performing regression test is a 
classical assumption test. This test consists of 
normality test, multicollinearity test, 
heteroscedasticity test, and autocorrelation test. 
The first classical assumption test is the normality 
test. A variable is said to be normal if it has a 
significant value above 0.05. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test results have a significant number above 0.05 for 
each variable and shown by the Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Normality Test 
Variable Value 
Discretionary Accrual 0.680 
Financial Leverage 0.756 
Sales Growth 0.756 
Logarithm Natural Asset 0.051 
 
The next classical assumption test is a 
multicollinearity test. Multicollinearity is a serious 
problem if continuous independent variable exceeds 
10. The common cut off value used to indicate the 
presence of multicollinearity is tolerance value ≥ 0.10 
or equal to VIF value ≤ 10. Based on Table 2 it is 
known that the tolerance value of all independent 
variables ≥ 0.10, as well as VIF values are all worth ≤ 
10, so it can be concluded that the regression model 
in this study is free from multicollinearity. 
 
Table 2 
Multicollinearities Test 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Financial Leverage 0,984 1,016 
Sales Growth 0,964 1,037 
Logarithm Natural Asset 0,980 1,021 
 
Detection of heteroscedasticities is to see whether 
there is a certain pattern of distribution on the 
scatterplot chart. If there is a certain pattern that is 
regular (wavy, widened then narrowed) then indicates 
there has been heteroscedasticity. The opposite result 
if the pattern does not show a clear pattern, as well as 
dots spread above and below the number 0 on the Y 
axis. Based on Figure 1 it appears that the dots spread 
randomly and spread either above or below the 
number 0 on Y axis. It can be concluded that there is 
no heteroscedasticity in the regression model, so that 
the regression model is appropriate to predict the 
hypothesis. 
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Fig. 1. Heteroscedasticities 
Autocorrelation test aims to test the linear 
regression model that is the correlation between 
intruder errors in period t and period t-1. If there is a 
correlation then there is an autocorrelation problem. 
Due to the amount of data being too large, I used run-
test to test autocorrelation. 
Run-test as part of non-parametric statistics can be 
used to test for residual correlation. If between 
residuals there is no correlation relationship (> 0.05) 
then it is said that the residual is random or random. 
Run-test is used to see if the residual occurs 
randomly or not. The decision of the hypothesis can 
be seen as follows. 
 
H0: Residual random (random). 
H1: Residual is not random. 
 
The test results show that the run-test value > 0.05 
which means the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Thus, the data used is quite random or random so 
there is no problem auto correlation on the data 
tested. 
 
Table 3 
Autocorrelation Test 
 Run-test Value 
Residual 0.121 
 
After testing the classical assumption, hypothesis 
testing is performed. This test is done by a partial T 
test and compares between T arithmetic and T table. 
To find T table then calculated as follows. 
t table = level of trust / 2; number of samples - 
number of dependent variables - 1 
or 
t table = α / 2; d.f = n - k - 1 
t table = 0.05 / 2; d.f = 1.887 - 3 - 1 
t table = 0.025; d.f = 1.883 
 
Based on the distribution table t value table, with a 
confidence level of 0.05 and d.f 1.883, then the value 
of t table is 1.961. The results of the Partial T Test are 
shown in table 4. In the three independent variables: 
financial leverage, sales growth and natural asset 
logarithm, only one of the results is significant 
against the dependent variable (discretionary 
accrual), i.e. financial leverage variable. 
Based on the research model that has been 
described above, then obtained the following multiple 
regression equation. 
 
DAt = β0 + β1FLt + β2Salest + β3LnAt + ɛt 
 
β0 = Constants 
FLt = Financial leverage year t 
Sales t = year sales growth t 
LnAt = Natural logarithm of year asset t 
ɛt = Regression error 
Stages of research 
The author calculates the discretionary accrual 
using a base year with the jones model formula 
(1991). The obtained coefficients are then 
incorporated into the modified jones model formula. 
The results obtained are non-discretionary accruals 
that will be deducted from the total accruals. The 
difference between non-discretionary accrual and 
total accrual is discretionary accrual. 
The mathematical results obtained show that from 
1,887 data of the firm year, 32% of them practice 
earnings management. The entire value obtained will 
be converted to an absolute value and will be the 
dependent variable of earnings management to test 
the hypothesis. 
 
Table 4 
Hypothesis Test 
Variable Coefficient t Sig. R2 
DA -0.748 -6.869 0.000  
FL 0.403 2.009 0.046 
0.332 SG 0.050 0.857 0.392 
LnA -0.034 -0.545 0.586 
 
It is known that the independent variable gives 
33.2% influence to the dependent variable (column 
R2). Based on the above table it can be formed the 
results of research regression as follows. 
DAt = -0,748 + 0,403X + 0,050X – 0,034X + ɛt 
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Regression results indicate that the variable 
financial leverage gives a significant effect on 
earnings management. This is shown by the 
regression test result table. In this table, the financial 
leverage variables are at T 2.009 or > 1.961. This 
statement is reinforced by the Sig value. Which is 
below 0.05 so the results are significant. The 
financial leverage variable also shows a direct or 
positive result on the regression result of 0.403. This 
means that each increase in financial leverage is one 
unit, the discretionary accrual increases by 0.403. If it 
can be concluded, then the first hypothesis (H1) that 
is financial leverage effect on earnings management 
can be accepted. Financial leverage shows the 
proportion of debt usage to finance its investment. 
The greater the company's debt, the greater the risk 
faced by investors. The results of the authors' 
research is significant and positive value means that 
when the financial leverage increases, the investor's 
attention to the condition of the company is 
increasing. The investor then acts to oversee the 
practices that occur in the company especially 
regarding earnings management. Linciani (2013) 
research, he found the influence of significant and 
positive financial leverage variable to earnings 
management. This means that the results of the study 
authors can be categorized consistent with previous 
research because it has the same results. 
The second variable, sales growth, showed 
insignificant results. Sales growth is worth 0.392 or is 
under the significant condition that is < 1.961. 
Significant terms are further strengthened by the Sig 
value. Which is above 0.05 is worth 0.857. This 
means that sales growth does not have a strong 
enough effect on earnings management. In the 
regression results, the variable of sales growth shows 
a positive number or direction with the dependent 
variable of 0.050. This means that if the sales growth 
increases by one unit, the discretionary accrual 
increases by 0.050. The conclusion is that the second 
hypothesis (H2) is unacceptable. Sales growth 
becomes one of the factors of profit management 
object by the company because of the view from the 
investor's point of view. According to the investor's 
point of view, the growth of a company is a sign that 
the company has a favorable aspect. Investors expect 
a high rate of return (return on investment) of the 
investments made. This leads management to manage 
its own earnings in terms of sales because some 
investors and/or potential investors focus on the 
company's sales growth rate. The Linciani (2013) 
study found a significant effect and positive outcome 
of sales growth on earnings management. Thus the 
results of this study cannot be said to be consistent 
with previous research because it has different 
results. 
Regression results show that the natural logarithm 
of assets has no significant effect on earnings 
management. This is shown by the value of -0.545 in 
the T column and 0.586 on the Sig column. This 
means that sales growth variables do not have a 
significant effect on earnings management. The 
regression result table also shows a negative number 
of -0.034. This means that if the natural logarithm of 
an asset increases by one unit, the discretionary 
accrual decreases by 0.034. The results of this 
regression also shows that between the two variables 
are not unidirectional because the negative value. The 
authors draw the conclusion that the third hypothesis 
(H3) is unacceptable, because it is negative and does 
not have a significant effect. The research conducted 
by the authors is inconsistent with the Lajarii (2013) 
study. Linciani found that there was a significant and 
positive influence between the natural logarithm of 
the asset and the earnings management. This means 
that in this study firm size has no significant effect on 
earnings management practices. The size of the 
company is one indicator of the practice of corporate 
earnings management. This is because the size of the 
company can determine the level of ease the 
company obtains funds as well as the bargaining 
power of the financial contract. The size of the firm 
will affect the company's funding structure. This led 
to the tendency for companies to require more funds. 
The need for a larger fund means that the company 
wants profit growth so there is an indication of 
earnings management practices. In the author's study, 
firm size has no significant effect. This shows that 
companies in Indonesia do not take advantage of firm 
size (total assets) as a profit management act. 
Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the effect of firm size 
on earnings management in listed companies 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 2010-2014. The earnings 
management is represented by the discretionary 
accrual dependent variable and is done by regressing 
the Jones Model modified by Dechow et al. (1995). 
The number of samples examined as many as 418 
samples or 1887 data of the company's year 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (beginning of 2015). 
The results of this study are quite consistent with 
the Lajarii (2013) study, the authors found that 
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companies engage in earnings management practices. 
This can be seen from the discretionary accrual table 
that the author has previously regressive. 
The independent variable has a low enough effect 
on the discretionary accrual variable, it is based on 
the analysis of coefficient of determination can be 
said that the effect of firm size to the management of 
earnings of 33.2%, while the remaining 66.8% is the 
influence of other factors not included in this 
research. 
Based on the hypothesis test can be concluded that 
the independent variable that significantly influence 
the dependent variable is financial leverage. Variable 
of sales growth and natural logarithm of asset have 
no significant effect to discretionary accrual because 
T value is above 1,961 and Sig column below 0.05. 
This means that the hypothesis received only the first 
hypothesis, namely financial leverage affect the 
earnings management. 
The authors acknowledge there are some 
limitations in this study. The limitations are as 
follows. Fist, independent variables in this study had 
an effect of only 33.2%, meaning that there are other 
variables not included in this study have a greater 
effect on earnings management. Second, year of 
study only within five years. 
Based on the results of research, conclusions and 
limitations faced by the author in developing the 
research, the authors expect some things that can be a 
reference for further researchers who want to develop 
this research. These suggestions authors summarize 
as follows: the next research can add other 
independent variables such as audit quality, CEO 
changes, and more; duration of research is longer to 
get more accurate results; company samples are 
obtained from private companies. 
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